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An Empirical Exploration of the Effects of Medical
Marijuana Laws
Benjamin Ehrens

Abstract:
This exploration into the multiple effects of medical marijuana laws on regional
marketplaces uses a novel data set and contributes three unique and important findings. First, in
states with medical marijuana legislation the price of marijuana is significantly lower than states
without similar legislation, this is likely due to measures that allow for legalized avenues of
production and distribution. Secondly, because of price breaks for bulk purchases, retail level
distributers operate on a downward sloping supply curve that is less steep in medical marijuana
states; this is likely due to decreased risk of distribution which may reduce preference for lower
margin, higher volume transactions. Finally, in states with medical marijuana laws, variance in
purchase price is substantially less, presumably due to the decreased cost of information seeking
and decreased risk of advertisement.
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Introduction:
As conventional policies aimed at curbing marijuana consumption continue to fall short,
new information is necessary to motivate better, more effective drug policy. There is no
comprehensive body of literature about the institutions and functions of the marijuana
marketplace, nor has there been an in-depth analysis of the market effects of medical marijuana
legislation, an important step in understanding the most commonly used illicit drug in the United
States. (The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2009) While this
paper does not attempt to provide a comprehensive understanding of marijuana markets, it begins
to fill the void in research surrounding the effects of medical marijuana laws on markets by
surveying the myriad effects of legislation on transactions.
Recently a new body of data has become available which allows for an in depth look into
the retail level market for marijuana. Not only is the data rich with important information on
price, quality and location, but it also overcomes some of the non-random sampling and
reliability issues of other data sets that have limited the power of previous research. This data
along with important contributions from other authors makes possible, a more accurate, yet
preliminary look into the effects of medical marijuana laws that alter the structure and
institutions of existing marketplaces.

Literature Review:
A great deal of research has been done into marijuana markets, the determinants of their
prices and apparent geographic discrepancy in pricing. Studies have explored the supply-side
effects of various drug policies and their impact on perceived danger of distribution using the
theory of the rational criminal as the basis for their analysis. (Reuter & Kleiman, 1986) Many
papers have implied a geographic difference in the price of marijuana and many contemporary
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studies concerning the markets for marijuana validate the assumption that the demand curve for
marijuana is downward sloping and that marijuana is a normal good (Clements, 2004, Caulkins
& Pacula, 2006)
A central concern in much of the research of illicit marketplaces is the quality and
availability of data, particularly in the case of drug marketplaces where transaction level data is
powerful, yet hard to come by. Clements uses collected prices of marijuana over a span of 9
years through undercover police purchases of unknown quantities and qualities, data collection
methods that, while useful, at the very least present issues of non-random sampling and omitted
variable bias. (Clements, 2004) Other models and papers have used both the Arrestee Drug
Abuse Monitoring Program which only observe arrestees reported price per unit. Similarly, the
National Survey on Drug Use and Health, observations were over-sampled to obtain better
estimates for Black and Hispanic users and do not account for geographical differences.
(Caulkins & Pacula)
Clements (2004) estimates demand in Australian markets using data acquired from
undercover police purchases. He tests for effects in the varying degrees of legality on
consumption and finds evidence for individual, regional marketplaces, decreasing prices over
time and a downward sloping demand curve. Additionally, Clements finds evidence of
discounted pricing with increasing quantities, possibly because of risk associated with every
transaction or other types of transactions costs.
Clements and Zhao, in their detailed book Economics and Marijuana (2010) have found
that recently marijuana has undergone a “hydroponic revolution.” Because marijuana can be
grown indoors it is no longer necessary that it only grown solely in areas conducive to outdoor
cultivation. This gives additional strength to the theory that regional market places are possible
and probable and has interesting implications on where marijuana can be grown as it no longer
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requires an ideal natural climate. Clements and Zhao have also proposed that marijuana
packaging, particularly as it relates to bulk discounts, is similar to other legal goods in that higher
volume transactions are preferred when transactions costs are a significant factor. Additionally,
they provide arguments explaining that some of the disparity in price paid between two
otherwise identical buyers is likely to information asymmetry and may not reflect any
substantive difference in product.
Caulkins & Pacula (2006) analyze The Substance Abuse And Mental Health Services
Administration’s National Household Survey on Drug Abuse and give insight into the structure
of the retail market. They find that over half of marijuana users have received marijuana for free
in 2001, however they make no distinction between smoking marijuana with others for free
versus receiving it in loose form. Most importantly, they distinguish marijuana transactions from
those that take place in open-air markets, as is typical for a heroin, cocaine, crack-cocaine or
methamphetamine transactions. Instead, they provide empirical evidence to suggest that the
majority of marijuana transactions take place in users’ or dealers’ homes or semi-private spaces.
This paints a picture of marijuana markets rooted in social circles rather than a more typical,
impersonal black market. Because marijuana transactions are typically between friends and
acquaintances rather than in open-air markets, information asymmetries could lead to larger
discrepancies in price between two otherwise equal buyers. This type of marketplace suggest that
retail level distributers may not take into account risk associated with distribution the same way
as distributers might, as the risks of getting caught are presumably lower due to a different
market structure and controlled clientele.
Finally, much of the literature surrounding the topic suggests that marijuana markets are
largely understudied. Pacula et al (2007) makes this explicitly clear when acknowledging that
virtually no work has been done on estimating a supply curve for marijuana. Pacula et al have
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argued that the supply curve is upward sloping, however the reasoning employed to reach that
conclusion had little empirical support.

General Theory:
Most illegal drugs’ rates of usage vary across geography.1 (Substance Abuse And Mental
Health Services Administration, 2007) Although both marijuana and agricultural products show
geographical price and consumption differences, they are likely not caused by the same thing.
One of the many explanations for the regional variances in marijuana usage is cultural and social
norms, acceptability and regional habit (tastes and preferences). One would expect that
equilibrium price will affect willingness to purchase marijuana based on social and legal
consequences. Using this reasoning, variables that approximate these norms or rates of usage
may represent demand shifters. Supply may also be affected by similar variables if one were to
assume that social acceptability and risk of being prosecuted were correlated. Unfortunately,
there is no reliable data available directly relating to the social acceptability of marijuana or
exact quantity consumed on a per state basis. There are, however, other estimates that can serve
some of the same functions like medical marijuana laws and less accurate estimates of the
number of marijuana users per state.
The effect of medical marijuana laws is particularly nuanced because of its implications
on both supply and demand. Medical marijuana laws are proposed by those who believe
marijuana to beneficial and passed by a majority who agree; in this light, beliefs about the drug
can be understood as indicators of social acceptability. Assuming this is true and that social
acceptability is a possible demand shifter, we may expect medical marijuana laws to represent a
relative increase in demand and therefore price. Another possible effect of medical marijuana
1

SAMHSA’s data corroborates the widely understood notion that certain drugs are more
prevalent in certain areas. For instance, heroin is much more widely used in urban areas.
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laws on demand is that medical laws make marijuana commercially available to patients of even
the most minor conditions, if we assume that these users would not otherwise be purchasing
marijuana, we would expect to see increases in demand. Interpreting the effect of medical
marijuana laws on price is complicated by the assumption that the laws almost certainly have an
effect on supply. One of many possible effects of medical marijuana laws on supply is that
certain channels of distribution become legalized. As the number of growers and distributers
increases we would expect an increase in supply that would have a downward effect on price.
Interestingly, the legitimization of certain means of cultivation and distribution may lead
to more perfect information between buyers and sellers. For instance, in many local newspapers
there are advertisements for different qualities, quantities and prices of marijuana readily
available to the consumer that may have the effect of stabilizing marijuana prices in a given
market. If retailers can advertise prices, it may induce competition among legitimate and
illegitimate distributers under the assumption that medical and non-medical marijuana are
competing goods. If this is true, we would expect to see variance negatively correlated with
Medical Marijuana Laws in tests for heteroscedasticity, a topic which will be explored later in
the paper.
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Data:
Data primarily comes from priceofweed.com, a crowd sourced, anonymously submitted
index that contains information on quantity purchased, amount paid, quality2 and location. One
of the main advantages to this database is that it is a large data set. After cleaning data for
observations that likely represent non-armslength transactions (less than $2 per gram) there are
still more than 23,000 complete observations. While the database is not entirely a random sample
as certain groups of users3 will be more likely to report, visitors have no incentive to submit
faulty information. Aside from access issues, the website is open to all, limiting issues of nonrandom sampling. An important limitation to note in this data is that reported quantity is
truncated at one ounce; this limitation has implications when attempting to estimate a complete
supply curve.
Along with the information regarding quantity quality and price, other demographic and
descriptive data have been added to observations based on location to control for other factors.
Data on drug use per state is gathered from The Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program and
The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Data on statewide median
income, population density and education is gathered from the US Census Bureau. We have
collected data on the legal status of marijuana from norml.org.
We believe that because marijuana is a normal good so median income (in thousands)
will have a positive effect on both quantity and price as it is likely a demand shifter. Population
density (measured in hundreds of people per square mile) also is likely another demand shifter in
that, given a normal distribution of marijuana users, it approximates number of consumers4.

2

A subjective rating of high, medium or low quality
Reporting on the website requires that you have Internet access and the interest to visit the site
and share purchase data.
4
We recognize that population density on the state level is imperfect and might be better suited
in a county specific as population is not uniformly distributed throughout the state, however we
still believe it to be useful, particularly in regions with smaller state size like New England.
3
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Lastly, we’ve added a the percentage of individuals in a given state who have consumed
marijuana in the past month, we believe this to be an indicator of cultural norms surrounding
marijuana and an indicator of the structure and robustness of the market considering it is, in part,
a socially distributed drug.
Table 1:
Mean
Quantity
(grams)

Mean PPG

Median
Population
Density

Division 1

13.14

$13.02

Division 2

13.34

$13.19

Division 3

13.17

Division 4

Mean
Marijuana
Use

% MMJ
laws

6.46

Mean
Median
Income
($1000)
$60.84

24.24%

67%

1873

5.04

$55.40

17.62%

33%

3503

$11.60

2.08

$48.34

16.89%

20%

3559

13.09

$12.24

0.58

$49.03

15.17%

0%

1724

Division 5

13.77

$11.81

5.6

$49.89

16.53%

33%

4167

Division 6

14.72

$10.74

1.18

$40.41

14.96%

0%

830

Division 7

14.6

$12.30

0.89

$45.93

11.97%

0%

1686

Division 8

14.06

$11.04

0.36

$50.63

17.88%

63%

1593

Division 9

14.15

$10.69

1.82

$57.25

17.58%

100%

4064

U.S.

13.69

$11.87

3.13

$51.98

17.15%

40%

23023

Table 2:
n

Percentage

Observations

23023

-

High Quality

14066

61%

Medium Quality

7514

33%

Low Quality

1443

6%

Medical Marijuana State
Observations

8337

36%

n
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Regions:
Because demographic data is captured at the statewide level, we have grouped states into
regions to avoid perfect colinearity with demographic data. We believe this to be a reasonable
solution considering that regional market places likely span across state lines. Regional dummys
are comprised of more than one state and grouped with other similar contiguous states according
to the US Census groupings.

Divisions: asterisks indicate medical marijuana laws
Division 1 – New England: Connecticut*, Maine*, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island* and Vermont*
Division 2 – Middle Atlantic: New Jersey*, New York and Pennsylvania
Division 3 – East North Central: Indiana, Illinois, Michigan*, Ohio and Wisconsin
Division 4 – West North Central: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota
and South Dakota
Division 5 – South Atlantic: Delaware*, DC*, Florida, Georgia, Maryland*, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia
Division 6 – East South Central: Alabama Kentucky, Mississippi and Tennessee
Division 7- West South Central: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas
Division 8 - Mountain: Arizona*, Colorado*, Idaho, New Mexico*, Montana*, Utah, Nevada*
and Wyoming
Division 9 - Pacific: Alaska*, California*, Hawaii*, Oregon* and Washington*
Medical Marijuana States: Washington, Vermont, Rhode Island, Oregon, New Mexico, New
Jersey, Nevada, Montana, Michigan, Maryland, Maine, Nevada, Hawaii, The District of
Columbia, Delaware, Connecticut, Colorado, California, Alaska and Arizona
Initial Regression:
Price
 β
Σ divisions β MedianIncome β MarijuanaUse β PrcBachelorsDegree
β HighQuality β% LowQuality β( MedicalMarijuana β) PopulationDensity
β+ PopulationDensitySquared
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Table 3 - Results:
Price Per OZ

Coefficient

Std Error

T

P

R =.24

n=23023

2

Population Density

-2.953986

0.7983596

-3.7

0

Population Density
Squared
Median Income (100)

0.0402457

0.0079159

5.08

0

4.096214

0.249347

16.43

0

Marijuana use 18-25

-1.269789

0.4625847

-2.74

0.01

Bachelors Degree %

-1.278114

0.2803891

-4.56

0

High Quality

125.2319

2.025976

61.81

0

Low Quality

-100.7192

4.073455

-24.73

0

Medical Marijuana Laws

-24.31816

3.494288

-6.96

0

Division 1

79.26636

6.885485

11.51

0

Division 2

81.71779

5.25806

15.54

0

Division 3

54.51247

4.446999

12.26

0

Division 4

57.81926

5.089843

11.36

0

Division 5

52.63758

4.633712

11.36

0

Division 6

53.7629

6.789829

7.92

0

Division 7

63.19737

5.525882

11.44

0

Division 8

16.09983

4.426812

3.64

0

Constant

72.88119

12.6692

5.75

0

All regional effects are statistically significant. The omitted division which all other
divisions are measured relative to is division 9. Division 9 has the lowest prices out of all other
regions as all other divisions have positive coefficients. Coefficients on quality are intuitive and
indicate that high-grade marijuana is more expensive per ounce than medium-grade marijuana
and low-grade marijuana sells for $100 less on average than mid-grade.
The population density quadratic indicates there may be a population density that allows
for the lowest prices. At very low population densities, there may be significant transaction and
transportation costs that contribute to increased prices. Additionally, the social structure of
marijuana distribution implies that as population increases, social networks may form allowing
easier purchase and lower costs. It may be the case that relatively high population densities are in
urban areas where drug enforcement is a higher priority, raising the associated risk and therefore
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price. More likely is that if marijuana smokers are somewhat randomly distributed, higher
densities mean more demand, and thus higher prices.5 If we accept the explanations for the Ushaped quadratic, it follows that there is a population density where law enforcement is not a
significant issue nor is the effect of price bidding, yet where there is enough demand to sustain a
marijuana production and consumption to be the point where, all else equal, prices are lowest.
The coefficient on median income supports the assumption that marijuana is a normal
good. Holding all else constant, for every thousand dollars median increases, the model predicts
a ~$4 increase in price per ounce. Median income as a demand shifter plays in important role
later when estimating a supply curve that necessitates the use of an instrument associated with
demand.

Structure of Medical Marijuana Markets:
In most states with medical marijuana laws, production and distribution are not regulated
to the extent that most other consumer commodities are. There are no solid figures to estimate
production, distribution and retail sales because there are no independent institutions designed to
do so. Medical marijuana is in most states a relatively new concept, and because of the
discrepancy between state and federal law, medical markets maintain questionable legal status.
Some states have legislated a distribution system that allows small businesses to purchase
marijuana from growers and sell to patients who have been referred by doctors. These systems
allow some monitoring of the market in that they provide licenses to dispensaries and monitor
doctor referrals, however they do not monitor where marijuana is coming from or how much is
being grown. (Regan, 2011) Other states like Rhode Island have until recently determined that

5

It is worth noting that the model only takes into account statewide population density, and that
most of the higher density states are located on the east coast where prices may be higher for
other reasons as well.
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they would provide medical marijuana cards to patients but leave it to patients to acquire it by
any means necessary, generally through established drug dealers. (Rhode Island Department of
Health, 2006) So, although these states are all considered to have medical marijuana laws, the
institutions governing them can be quite different from state to state.
In most states with dispensary style distribution, there are no requirements regarding the
business structure of the dispensaries and few guidelines for growers. Because of the lax nature
of the laws, many sellers operate for-profit enterprises that in some areas can be intensely
competitive, take for example the 750 registered dispensaries in Los Angeles alone or the 187
advertising in Washington state on the registry legalmarijuanadispensary.com, a website with an
index of individual dispensaries products and prices. (Kelsey, 2012)
The competitive nature of some states’ marketplaces have incited a variety of sellers to
enter the market, however because of the questionable legal standing of the industry, the types of
entrepreneurs in the industry vary. Although the Department of Justice has made it clear that they
will not prosecute any enterprise expressly following state laws, they have on more than one
occasion seized the property of and prosecuted persons flaunting their wealth and excessive scale
of operations. (DEA, 2011) Take for instance Chris Bartkowicz of Colorado who after appearing
in a local news spot about the emerging marijuana economy found himself the subject of a
federal investigation and lawsuit. Similarly, take Luke Scarmazzo, a successful medical
marijuana businessman only to be taken down after releasing a rap video in which he refers to
the DEA unfavorably. (Huffington Post, 2011) Considering the competitive nature of the
industry and the very real incentives to keep a low profile and profit reasonable, it is perfectly
clear why prices are in part lower in states with medical marijuana dispensaries. In these states,
owners have little ability to set prices and even if they did, they would have every incentive to
limit either scale of operations or price.
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Determinants of Medical Marijuana Laws:
Considering that medical marijuana laws are usually passed by voters, a look into the
demographic factors that determine the existence of medical laws might be revealing. Using the
data already collected, a simple regression in the following form helps to understand the basics
of what makes medical marijuana laws more likely in a state.
./01234 5367  8 932:/4;<7=/><//?@A
8 .3<1IC3E3J7/

8 ?;BC43D1;E=/E71DF

8 ./013EGE2;H/

Table 4:
Medical Marijuana Law
Dummy
Bachelors Degree Percentage

Coef.

Std. Err.

T

P

-0.0276854

0.0079397

-3.49

0.001

Population Density

0.0061687

0.002444

2.52

0.015

Median Income

0.0327159

0.0075696

4.32

0.000

Marijuana Use

0.0485821

0.0129522

3.75

0.000

Constant

-1.405018

0.3563571

-3.94

0.000

Because Medical Marijuana Laws are represented by a dummy variable, each coefficient
is interpreted as a percentage change in the likelihood of marijuana laws. In this regression,
every one percent increase in regular marijuana use for 18-25 year olds indicates an increase in
the likelihood of medical marijuana laws in that state by 4 percent - not surprising considering
the democratic process.
While these results are indicative of a link between marijuana use and medical marijuana,
causation is still not certain considering the limited nature of the data. One argument may be that
given medical marijuana laws, a larger portion of legitimate and illegitimate medical users will
consume medical marijuana on a regular basis; this type of explanation argues that increased
marijuana use is caused by medical laws. Another argument would be to say that populations
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with high rates of marijuana usage are more likely to vote medical marijuana laws into existence;
this type of explanation argues that medical marijuana laws are caused by populations with
relatively higher marijuana usage.
It its likely that medical marijuana laws are not randomly distributed as roughly
evidenced by the regression above. Although it should come as no surprise, there is a subtle
implication involved. If medical marijuana laws cannot be determined to be random, differences
in marijuana markets between states with and without medical marijuana laws are not necessarily
caused by the laws themselves and may be due to preexisting structural differences in the
marketplaces. This is not to say that we cannot be sure that medical marijuana laws have any
effect on markets. As we’ve already explored, medical marijuana laws do significantly change
the structure of cultivation, distribution and retail.
Estimating A Supply Curve:
Estimating a supply curve for all marijuana purchases will help us to understand the
general market before distinguishing between medical marijuana market supply curves and
others. Both price and quantity are equilibrium outcomes meaning that they are both
simultaneously determined by supply and demand. We assume the supply equation takes the
standard form: KL  8

8 ?<12/

8 ..M

8 N1>: KC341DF

8 5;6 KC341DF

C, we

add the medical marijuana dummy to control for differences between the two presumably
different markets. Demand quantity may be expressed by an equation similar to K0 
8

8 ?<12/

8 ./013E GE2;H/

C where median income is positively correlated with

quantity under the assumption that marijuana is a normal good.
Estimating the supply curve with two stage least squares requires the use of an instrument
correlated with demand but not supply. In the first stage regression, median income proved to be
correlated with price; with the additional reasonable assumption that median income is a demand
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shifter and uncorrelated with price, median income serves as a good instrument for our two stage
least squares supply regression.
Because the data from priceofweed.com is censored at one ounce, the dependent variable
is truncated at the source of collection. In order to get better estimates from a censored variable,
a tobit model with a right bound at one ounce can be used to test for robustness along with the
results of OLS.
Table 5:
The results of the supply regressions not controlling for region with p scores in parenthesis

Grams
Price

OLS

Tobit

-0.51 (0.00)

-0.75 (0.00)

Medical Marijuana Laws

0.07(0.67)

0.16(0.54)

Low Quality

2.81 (0.00)

4.61 (0.00)

High Quality

2.11 (0.00)

3.21 (0.00)

18.27 (0.00)

23.74 (0.00)

Constant
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Table 6:
Controlling for region
Grams
Price

OLS

Tobit

-0.54 (0.00)

-0.75 (0.00)

Medical Marijuana Laws

0.63 (0.00)

0.99 (0.00)

Low Quality

2.64 (0.00)

4.50 (0.00)

High Quality

2.25 (0.00)

3.20 (0.00)

Division 1

0.68 (0.11)

0.85 (0.20)

Division 2

1.18 (0.01)

1.55 (0.02)

Division 3

0.09 (0.78)

0.02 (0.97)

Division 4

0.36 (0.39)

0.54 (0.40)

Division 5

0.83 (0.01)

1.10 (0.03)

Division 6

1.39 (0.00)

2.14 (0.00)

Division 7

1.85(0.00)

2.87 (0.00)

Division 8

0.084 (0.78)

0.17 (0.73)

Constant

17.75 (0.00)

22.64 (0.00)

There are two distinct ways to interpret the results. First we will explore them under the
assumption that what we are actually estimating is a production supply curve. Under this
assumption, the results show a downward sloping supply curve; for every increase of one dollar,
quantity falls somewhere between a quarter to two thirds of a gram. Although the results seem
counterintuitive considering the traditional slope usually assumed to slope upward, there may be
an explanation considering the illicit nature of marijuana.
The classic slope of the average cost curve is a U shape, sloping downward at smaller
quantities. One explanation of a downward sloping supply curve considering the results would be
to say that since a supply curve is derived from a firm’s marginal cost curve, at lower quantities
of production the supply curve actually does slope down. Due to the illicit nature of the
marijuana market, suppliers may never reach minimum efficient scale. Marijuana cultivation is
efficient in quantities not possible for the average illicit grower. It is estimated that costs minus
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processing for a single, legal acre grow site ccould be as low as $70 per pound compared to a
minimum of $215 for a 1500 square foot grow house
house. (Caulkins, 2010)
While the inability to reach minimum efficient scale is aan
n elegant explanation, we cannot
conclude that to be the case or exclude other possibilities because our data is truncated at the
retail level. As we have specified in the regression equation, price is independent and quantity
responds, however at the retail level it is likely that neither price or quantity are entirely
independent of each other. Clements
lements writes that marijuana exhibits certain similarities
milarities to other
products in bundling and packaging which result in price breaks for increased quantities.
(Clements & Zhao, 2009) A quick break down of average cost per gram relative to common
packaged quantities
antities reveals the following:
Table 7:
Quantity

Average Price Per Gram

Eigth Ounce

14.8

Quarter Ounce

11.7

Half Ounce

9.9

One Ounce

9.1

Graph 1:

onsidering the transaction and transportation costs along with possible risks associated
Considering
with distributing marijuana, retailers and distributers may offer price breaks for larger purchases
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of marijuana. Preference for a slightly a lower margin but higher volume transaction that
decreases associated transaction costs and risks would explain a downward sloping retail level
supply curve independently of any possible production factors. In an illicit market place, each
transaction exposes both parties to risk and each transaction also imposes a cost on the distributer
because, if nothing else, transactions take time to complete. If it were true that distributers were
adverse to increased implicit costs and risk, we would expect to see markets with lower
transactions costs and risk associated with a transaction exhibit a less steep, flat or possibly
positively sloped supply curve.

Differentiated Supply Curve:
Regional markets with medical marijuana laws and quasi-legitimate forms of distribution
may exhibit an upward sloping, flat or less steep downward sloping supply curve for several
reasons. The medical marijuana market as earlier shown to have a downward effect on marijuana
prices in some markets must allow for some legal avenues of cultivation and distribution which
may be more efficient because of larger operations. Additionally and more relevant to our data,
with established retailers and less damning laws, transactions costs and risk may be less of a
determinant of price in a retail market.
Creating an interaction variable between medical marijuana laws and price effectively
separates out the supply curves of medical marijuana states and those without the laws. If the
assumption that medical marijuana states have a different supply curves holds, then we would
expect to see an additional statistically significant, negative coefficients on the interaction and
price variable. Adding it to the instrumented regression equation we should expect a less
downward sloping supply curve with price plus the interaction term than with just price alone.

19
Equation:

Price is instrumented with median income as in the first equation.
Table 9:
Grams:
Price
Medical Marijuana Laws
Medical Marijuana Price
Interaction
Low Quality
High Quality
Constant

OLS
-0.29 (0.01)
7.20 (0.00)
-0.61 (0.00)

Tobit
-0.43 (0.02)
10.73 (0.00)
-0.90 (0.00)

3.27 (0.00)
1.63 (0.00)
15.87 (0.00)

5.30 (0.00)
2.49 (0.00
20.15 (0.00)

Graph 2: A visual representation using OLS estimates

All results are statistically significant and give expected signs. The results here indicate
that in states with medical marijuana laws, suppliers are operating on a less steep supply curve.
This is consistent with earlier conjectures that medical marijuana laws may serve to lower
transactions costs
ts along with risk associated with distribution, thereby lowering the incentive to
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provide price breaks for larger quantities.
Variance in Markets:
Earlier in the paper we posited that some medical marijuana laws have helped to make a
more competitive marketplace. We assume that this is in part due to provisions that allow the
establishment of dispensaries that decrease the cost to buyers and suppliers to distribute and seek
information. If this is true we may expect to see less variance in price paid for purchases made in
medical marijuana states. To get this information we will take u2 from the first stage regression
and regress all relevant variables including medical marijuana laws on the squared term. If
medical marijuana laws do help to create a more competitive market and stabilize price, we
would expect to see statistically significant negative coefficients associated with medical
marijuana laws.
Table 10:
Variance
Medical Marijuana Laws
Low Quality
High Quality
Marijuana Use
Median Income ($1000)
Population Density
Division 1
Division 2
Division 3
Division 4
Division 5
Division 6
Division 7
Division 8
Constant

Coef.
-3278.86 (0.048)
-217.98 (0.922)
-9939.01 (0.00)
-433.62 (0.051)
265.92 (0.003)
30.59 (0.693)
1930.19 (0.509)
697.50 (0.759)
156.56 (0.943)
-280.20 (0.919)
2422.81 (0.287)
4784.21 (0.165)
3768.37 (0.210)
-2093.90 (0.373)
19722.98 (0.003)

When medical retailers or other distributers do not face the same risks associated with
advertising and information as other distributers might, the costs of advertising go down and new
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opportunities to distribute information arise. As distributers are able to disseminate information
and users can find information more readily, buyers are better able to find lower prices and
distributers are pressured to compete. Results from the equation suggest that medical marijuana
laws reduce variance of price paid as do high and medium quality. These results give empirical
weight to our argument that due to the institutional changes in markets caused by medical
marijuana laws, price information becomes more readily available and prices are more stable.

Conclusion:
This paper provides empirical evidence of significant price effects of medical marijuana
laws. Medical marijuana laws tend to decrease price, variance in pricing, and pricing breaks for
larger purchases. Presumably downward effects on price are due to legalized avenues of
production that increase supply, making marijuana comparatively cheaper than non medical
marijuana states. We assume that decreased variance in pricing is largely due to the changes in
market structure that medical marijuana laws allow, mainly that advertising and information
seeking is less costly. Finally, we find evidence that the supply curve for medical marijuana is
relatively less steep but still downward sloping compared to non-medical marijuana states, this is
likely due to decreased transaction costs and risk associated with distribution that lessen
incentives to provide bulk discounts. In seeking explanation for unconventional supply curve
results, we have developed interesting but weakly supported hypothesis about the production
supply curve beyond observations of one ounce, however due to our data limitations no
conclusion can be reached.
As always, a more robust model is possible. In this case, time, resources and availability
of data limit designing a panel data model that can track price changes in a given state before and
after medical marijuana laws took effect. This would be a better way to argue causality between
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laws affecting supply and the effects we see here. Additionally, observations beyond one ounce
could give more accurate insights into a production supply curve that is likely different from the
retail curve we are able to analyze with our data. Future papers might soon be able to look into
the differences in regional production due to the soon to be instituted legal reforms which make
producing marijuana legal and will likely make accurate data collection an easier task.
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